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Abstract 
The geographic concentration of production of main field crops in several growing 
regions is a distinctive feature of U.S. agriculture. Among many possible reasons for 
spatial concentration, I study here the effects of the distribution of end users and terminal 
markets on acreage allocation. The presence of multiple terminal markets in a growing 
area may allow for a more flexible marketing plan, along with introducing more 
idiosyncratic demand uncertainty associated with each consumption point. To take better 
advantage of future marketing opportunities, growers, depending on their location 
relative to terminal markets, may adjust the crop mix produced on the farm. I characterize 
the types of environments that lead to a spatial production concentration of a commodity 
in a growing area. I also analyze the equilibrium effects of an increase in transportation 
costs and a shift in acreage available for planting on spatial acreage allocation. 
 
Keywords: commodity prices, location, marketing, production concentration, 
supermodularity, systematic risk.
  
 
 
 
SPATIAL PRODUCTION CONCENTRATION, DEMAND UNCERTAINTY,  
AND MULTIPLE MARKETS 
Introduction 
In recent years, agricultural market analysts have paid increasingly more attention to 
the spatial concentration of production in both animal and grain agriculture. In particular, 
the geographic concentration of production of main field crops in several growing regions 
is a distinctive feature of the U.S. agricultural landscape. Spatial production patterns are 
shaped by a host of factors, including agronomic considerations, proximity to input 
markets, vertical integration, farm size, and environmental regulations. I will focus here 
on another essential feature of the grower’s decision environment: the presence of 
multiple end users and terminal markets in the growing area. 
By allowing for a more flexible marketing plan, the ability to access multiple terminal 
markets and consumption points lowers the degree of systematic demand risk faced by 
growers at planting. To take better advantage of future marketing opportunities, growers, 
depending on their locations relative to terminal markets, may adjust the crop mix pro-
duced on the farm, which in turn affects the production concentration in the region. The 
goal of this paper is to develop a framework for studying the spatial concentration of 
production of a commodity in a growing area in the presence of multiple terminal markets.  
The issue of land allocation among competing crops is important for policymakers 
because agricultural technologies and production practices may have significant envi-
ronmental consequences, such as pesticide use patterns, pest resistance, impacts on 
biodiversity and beneficial insects, soil management, and other types of externalities 
(e.g., Feedstuffs 2002a,b). These environmental impacts are likely to differ across and 
within producing regions, in part because of the variation in the spatial production 
concentration (e.g., Feedstuffs 2002c). An understanding of how marketing conditions in 
the area interact with growers’ planting decisions may help policymakers design better 
policies for promoting environmentally friendly farming practices. Also, regional produc-
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tion patterns are intimately connected with the demand for and development of transpor-
tation and grain handling infrastructures, which include in-land waterway systems, 
railroads, and trucks (McVey, Baumel, and Wisner 2000).  
Figure 1 presents some evidence on the variation in production concentration within 
growing regions, using as an example the states of Illinois and Iowa. Relative production 
concentration is measured by the average ratios of acreages planted to corn and soybeans, 
the two main crops in Illinois and Iowa, across counties that are roughly ordered by 
geographic regions within a state (e.g., northeast, northwest). Examining the two graphs,  
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002. 
FIGURE 1. Average ratios of corn and soybean acreages at the county level, 1998-2002 
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corn and soybean crops appear to be considerably more evenly distributed across the 
growing area in Illinois than in Iowa; the standard deviations of the two series are, 
respectively, 0.014 and 0.32. 
A number of factors influences acreage allocation decisions on a particular farm in a 
particular year. These may include soil characteristics, local weather conditions preceding 
and during the planting period, cost of inputs, various area-specific pest management 
issues, crop rotation benefits, cultivation practices, and government programs. Also, local 
demand conditions, transportation costs to the terminal markets, and the distribution of 
growers in the area have a bearing on the pattern of land allocation among different crops 
at a particular location. The prevalence of corn (soybean) acreage in some Iowa counties 
(see Figure 1) can be explained, at least partially, by a higher demand for a particular 
commodity for local uses rather than production-side considerations. 
There are several indications, although indirect, that growers in Iowa routinely ac-
cess a larger array of local markets and end users than do growers in Illinois. Commodity 
flow patterns suggest that growers in Illinois are more advantageously located to serve 
relatively more geographically concentrated export markets. Based on the estimates of 
the shares of transportation modes used for shipment in these two states, the share of 
production shipped by water for exports (“long-haul” movement) in Illinois exceeds that 
in Iowa (Berry, Hewings, and Leven 2003). On the other hand, a recent survey of Iowa 
farmers points out an increasing reliance on more flexible truck transportation and the 
ability of producers to deliver crops to multiple and diversified end users, such as feeding 
operations, processing facilities, and river markets (Baumel et al. 2001).  
A greater number of geographically dispersed end users in the area not only expands 
the set of marketing strategies available to growers but also introduces more idiosyncratic 
demand uncertainty associated with each consumption point. My inquiry is into the role 
of multiple terminal markets, possessed of demand uncertainty that can be both commod-
ity and market specific, on equilibrium acreage allocation in a growing region. Here, I 
examine the conjecture that the spatial distribution of terminal markets may cause pro-
duction of certain commodities to concentrate in certain regions. 
Note that producers in areas where transportation costs to different markets are simi-
lar more frequently market their crops based on the price differentials across markets than 
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do producers who are closer to one particular market. This producer heterogeneity in the 
propensity to switch marketing outlets establishes the link between the extent of demand 
uncertainty when it takes the form of a commodity- and market-specific price volatility 
and spatial concentration of production in certain parts of the region. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a model is developed, and a gen-
eral property of the equilibrium spatial acreage allocation is established. Then the notions 
of a spatial concentration of production and greater market-specific demand volatility are 
introduced. After investigating the quantitative effect of market-specific demand volatil-
ity on equilibrium acreage allocation, some determinants of the acreage allocation pattern 
in the spatial dimension are discussed. Next, sufficient conditions leading to a complete 
local spatial concentration of production are presented, and the equilibrium effects of an 
increase in transportation costs and a more spatially concentrated acreage distribution are 
investigated. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible lines of further inquiry. 
 
Model 
Consider a region with n  terminal markets, indexed ni ,...,1 , for two types of 
commodities h  and l . Producers at each location are differentiated by transportation 
costs to the terminal markets. Transportation costs per unit of distance are invariant 
across commodities, are normalized to 1, 1e , and are proportional to the corresponding 
distances to each market, ied , ]1,0[id , ni ,...,1 . Let nFD ]1,0[  denote the set of 
feasible distances to the terminal markets in the region. The number of acres at locations 
with transportation costs ( ndd ..., ,1 ) FD , or less, is given by the cumulative distribution 
function ),...,( 1 nddF  with a strictly positive support on FD  and the corresponding 
density function ),...,( 1 nddf .1 The total number of acres in the region is normalized to 1, 
1
FD
dF . The per acre costs of producing the two commodities, hc  and lc , are invariant 
across locations. The yields are certain, common across both varieties and locations, and 
are normalized to 1. There are two time points: the planting time when producers decide 
which variety to plant, and the harvest time when producers decide to which terminal 
market to ship their crop. 
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At terminal market i , inverse demands for the two commodities are given by 
),,,(,  qilihiiqqi ssPp  , hlq , , where qis  is the quantity of commodity q  shipped to 
market i . Demand uncertainty is decomposed into uncertainty that is common across 
both markets and commodities,  , and commodity- and market-specific uncertainty, 
summarized by the parameter qi . For example, the former type of uncertainty stems 
from news disseminated through public media about the end-use qualities of the two 
commodities. To concentrate on the effects of multiple markets on acreage allocation, I 
will ignore this type of uncertainty as it does not have much relevance to the analysis that 
follows.2 The focus here is on the uncertainty that is related to local conditions, such as 
demand from adjacent feeding operations and processing plants for a particular commod-
ity. Hold that 0, iq
sq
P  and 0, iqP
 
 where the subscripts denote differentiation. 
Furthermore, assume that the degree of substitutability, if any, between commodities h  
and l  in consumption is limited: ),,0(, lih sP  and ),0,(, hil sP  for all ni ,...,1 . 
The joint cumulative probability distribution of the demand shocks is given by 
),,...,,( 11 lnhnlhG   with support on n2],[  . 
Analysis 
At harvest time, producers of commodity q  located at ndd ..., ,1  decide where to 
market their crop based on the relative prices net of transportation costs 
 ][max),,...,(
},...,1{1 i
q
i
niN
dpqdd 
 
 . (1) 
Therefore, commodity q  producers located in areas jiFn
q
i ddDddS  :,...,{ 1  
,
q
j
q
i pp 	 }ij 
  supply market i . In equilibrium, the relative distance, qijji ddd  , 
at the locations of threshold producers that are indifferent between shipping commodity 
q  to market i  and market j  is equal to the price differential between markets i  and j , 
q
j
q
i pp  : 
 0),,(),,( ,,  qijqjljhjjqqilihiiq dssPssP  , hlq , ,  (2) 
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where  h
iS
n
h
i dFzzs ),...,( 1 ,   l
iS
n
l
i dFzzs )),...,(1( 1 , and ]1,0[),...,( 1 ndd  
denotes the share of acres at locations with ndd ..., ,1  planted to variety h . Note that the 
assumptions made about the inverse demand functions rule out “corner” solutions by 
assuring that the amount of each commodity supplied to each market is strictly positive. 
Let qij
q
ij dd sup  and 
q
ij
q
ij dd inf  denote the largest and smallest realization of the 
price differential between markets i  and j  for commodity q , qjiqij dd  . Then the 
locations of commodity q  producers that may deliver their crop to either of M  
},...,1{ n  markets are qMD ,:,...,{ 1 qijjiqijFn ddddDdd 		 ,qikki ddd 	 Mji  , , 
}Mk  . The purpose of defining such areas in the producing region will become 
apparent in Result 1. All commodity q  producers located in q iMD }{   always ship their 
crop to market i . In contrast, commodity q  producers located in qMD , },...,{ jiM   
where nji 		1  may ship their crop to any of the markets in M  depending on the 
price differential. Therefore, the growing region can be divided into two types of areas 
distinguished by the available marketing opportunities. In “arbitrage” areas, producers 
alternate between two or more markets in order to take advantage of the price differential. 
In “no-arbitrage” areas, producers always supply only one market because the price 
differential never covers the additional transportation expense.  
At planting time, producers choose which variety to plant, anticipating the marketing 
opportunities available at harvest: 
 
q
nhlqN
cqddEdd 
 
),,...,(max),...,( 1},{1  ,  (3) 
where E  is the expectation operator with respect to random variables qi . Based on the 
limited degree of substitutability between commodities in consumption, ),,0(, lih sP  
and ),0,(, hil sP , the following can be readily inferred about the acreage allocation 
pattern in terms of “no-arbitrage” and “arbitrage” areas.   
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RESULT 1. Suppose that 0),...,Pr( 11  qinqinqiqi dddd  for i },...,1{ nA  . Then any 
planting time equilibrium is characterized by 
 
ll
i
hh
i cEpcEp  , Ai ,  (4) 
and both commodities are produced in the areas near market i , where the “no-arbitrage” 
areas for both commodities overlap,  l
i
h
i DD
n dFzz
}{}{
),...,( 1
 
 )1,0( , and only commodity 
h  ( l ) is produced in the areas, where the “arbitrage” areas for commodity h  ( l ) and “no-
arbitrage” areas for commodity l  ( h ) overlap, )0(1),...,( 1 ndd  for all ),...,( 1 ndd  
l
i
h
Mi DD }{}{    ( hil Mi DD }{}{   ), Ai , },...,{ jkM   where njk 		1 . 
 
Result 1 provides a partial characterization of the equilibrium acreage allocation in an 
environment in which planting decisions are governed by future spatial arbitrage consid-
erations. Suppose that there is a positive probability that the price at market i  is low 
relative to prices at all other markets so that occasionally all producers who sometimes 
deliver to i  ship their crop to other markets. Then in the area “near” market i  but “away” 
from all other markets, ij 
 , the mix of the crops is produced. The areas located “near” 
market i  but “closer” to the other markets, which are better suited for taking advantage 
of the spatial price inequalities, will be planted to a commodity with “greater” spatial 
price differentials, qijd . 
To simplify presentation, for the rest of the paper I consider a producing region with 
just two terminal markets, 2,1i . In this case, the probability condition in Result 1 holds 
trivially because there are only two possible marketing outlets. The spatial acreage 
allocation pattern is illustrated in Figure 2 where the curve bounding areas A, B, C, D, 
and E correspond to points with qddd 1221   and qddd 1221  , hlq , .
3
 In Figure 2, in 
the areas where both commodities are always shipped to the closest market,  
A lh DD }1{}1{   and D
lh DD }2{}2{  , the mix of the two is produced. On the other hand, in 
areas B lh DD }1{}2,1{   and C
hl DD }2{}2,1{  , one commodity is always shipped to the 
closest market while the marketing plan for the other one depends on the price  
8 / Saak 
1 2ld 12  
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h,l h l h,l 
A B C D E 
 
FIGURE 2. Spatial acreage allocation pattern 
 
differential. In equilibrium, only the latter commodity will be produced in those areas: 
commodity h  in area B and commodity l  in area C.  
Areas with small differences in transportation costs to markets 1 and 2, such as area 
E in Figure 2, are dominant in terms of the spatial arbitrage opportunities. Producers of 
both commodities located in these areas determine their marketing plan based on relative 
prices. Next, I investigate the determinants of the planting decisions in such overlapping 
“arbitrage” areas. For producers in areas lh DD }2,1{}2,1{  :,{ 21 dd  
],max[ lh dd 21 dd  ]},min[ lh dd , the expected incremental return from switching 
from variety l  to h  is given by4 
 ),,((),,(),,( 212121 lddEchddEqddE hq   )lc  (5) 
 ]},max[],{max[ 21212121 ddppddppE llhh  , 
where condition (4) was used. Differentiating (5) with respect to )( 21 dd   yields 
}11{)(/),,(
212121212121 ddppddppq
llhhEddqddE
    
  	 )Pr( 2121 ddpp hh  
)Pr( 2121 ddpp ll 	 . 
In general, the incremental profit (5) may rise or fall as the relative distance (trans-
portation costs) to the markets, 21 dd  , increases. Suppose that the market price 
differentials for commodities h  and l  are ordered by the first-degree stochastic domi-
nance, so that )Pr( 21 ppp hh 	 )Pr()( 21 ppp ll 		  for all ]1,1[p . If the price 
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differential between markets 1 and 2 for commodity h  is likely to be larger (smaller) 
than that for commodity l , the equilibrium acreage allocation pattern takes the following 
form. Commodity h ( l ) is produced in the areas with small 21 dd   (near market 1 and 
away from market 2), while commodity l  ( h ) is produced in the areas with large 21 dd   
(near market 2 and away from market 1). Next, I consider conditions on the price differ-
entials that lead to spatial production patterns that are of central interest in this study. 
Suppose that there exists a )1,1(ˆ p  such that for pp ˆ , )Pr( 21 ppp hh 	  
)Pr( 21 ppp ll 		  and )Pr()Pr( 2121 pppppp llhh 		  for pp ˆ	 . As is well known, 
this type of single-crossing condition may imply the second-degree stochastic dominance. 
Then the incremental profit, ),,( 21 qddEq  , increases with the transportation cost 
differential, 21 dd  , in the areas “closer to market 1 than to market 2,” where 
pdd ˆ21 	 , and decreases in the areas “closer to market 2 than to market 1,” where 
pdd ˆ21  . Therefore, in equilibrium, commodity h  will be produced somewhere in the 
“middle” of the “arbitrage” region, while commodity l  will be produced outside of the 
“middle” area. In other words, the production of a commodity characterized by a greater 
extent of market-specific price volatility is relatively more geographically concentrated in 
the “middle” of the “arbitrage” area. Next, I make more precise the notions of market-
specific price volatility and geographic concentration and investigate the connection 
between them.  
Market-Specific Demand Uncertainty and Production Concentration: Definitions 
A further inquiry into the determinants of acreage allocation patterns warrants the 
following. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. (i) ),,,( 2211 lhlhG  ),(),( 2121 lllhhh GG  , ),(),( 1221  hh GG  , 
),(),( 1221  ll GG  ; (ii) ),(),( 1221 ddFddF   for all ]1,0[, 21 dd ; 
 (iii) ),,(1, qlhq ssP  ),,(2, qlhq ssP  ),,( qlhq ssP  , hlq , ; (iv) 0h
sl
P , 0l
sh
P . 
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Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) assure that markets 1 and 2 are “symmetric.” Conditions (i) allow 
us to better focus on the forces behind the concentration of production of one commodity 
in a particular area other than ex ante asymmetries in demand across markets. Demand 
shocks for commodities h  and l  are independent, and demand shocks for each commod-
ity at markets 1 and 2 are exchangeable random variables (see endnote 2). According to 
condition (ii), the distribution of acreage in the region is symmetric, which, for example, 
prevents an asymmetric concentration of acreage near one of the markets. Part (iv) is 
another simplifying assumption that excludes any cross-price effects, so that the only 
interaction between the crops is on the supply side. 
In addition, I make the following behavioral assumption about the equilibrium spa-
tial distribution of acres between the two commodities. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2. For any ),( 21 dd  and ),( 21 dd  , if 121121 ),(),( dddddd    or 
221221 ),(),( dddddd    then ),(),( 2121 dddd  . 
 
This assumption assures that it is only the location of producers relative to markets 1 and 
2 that influences their planting decisions. Suppose that the expected revenues of produc-
ers after compensating them for the cost of transportation to one of the markets are 
identical. Then the crop mix at each location is also identical. Assumption 2 amounts to 
taking all other factors determining the acreage allocation to be invariant across locations 
and the number of producers at each point in the region to be large. The invariance of the 
“transportation cost compensated” revenues across locations implies either the lack of 
“material” differences between the locations of the two producers or that the producers 
never alternate between marketing outlets. Write the “market 1 transportation cost 
compensated” revenues for producers with ),( 21 dd  and ),( 21 dd   as follows: 
]],max[[max),( 2121121 qqqq cddppEddd  , 
]],max[[max),( 2121121 qqqq cddppEddd  . 
By inspection, the left-hand sides are equal in one of two instances. The differences in 
transportation costs may be the same, 21 dd  21 dd  . Then the optimal marketing 
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decisions at harvest are trivially the same for these producers, and hence their planting 
decisions must conform. Otherwise, it must be that at any harvest time equilibrium, 
11 dp q  22 dp q   and qq pdp 211  2d   for hlq ,  (see equation (4)). In other words, 
for any realization of uncertainty, producers of both commodities located at ),( 21 dd  and 
),( 21 dd   always ship their crop to market 1.  
Assumption (ii) results in symmetric spatial acreage allocation when the prices are 
exchangeable random variables (i.e., the ex ante prices are symmetric across markets). 
The spatial acreage allocation is determined only up to the relative distance, 21 dd  , in 
the sense that ),( 21 dd  ),( 21 dd    for all || 21 dd  || 21 dd  , and hence, qq dd  , 
hlq , . In particular, from Result 1 and using Assumption 2, it follows that 
)1,0(),( 21  dd  on  )( }1{}1{ lh DD  )( }2{}2{ lh DD   :,{ 21 FDdd   || 21 dd  
]},max[ lh dd . Finally, observe that in a case when the realizations of demand shocks are 
always common across markets, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that in equilibrium, 
),( 21 dd )1,0(   for all FDdd 21,  so that production of each commodity is evenly 
distributed everywhere in the region. And so, given these assumptions, any concentration 
of production is caused precisely by the market-specific uncertainty that differs across 
commodities. 
Next, I formalize the concepts of spatial production concentration and market-
specific uncertainty (the extent of systematic demand risk across markets). 
 
DEFINITION 1. (Spatial Production Concentration). Spatial distribution of shares of acres 
under commodity h , ),( 21 dd , is said to undergo a (symmetric) increase in concentra-
tion around the center, denoted by ),( 21 dd ),( 21 ddspc  	 , if 
 
1
0
1
0 21
),( dFzz   
1
0
1
0 21
),( dFzz  and  
 

1
0 21
2
2
),(dz
dz
dFzz  
 

	
1
0 21
2
2
),(dz
dz
dFzz  for all 
]1,0[d . 
 
An increase in spatial production concentration for commodity l  can be defined 
analogously by replacing ),( 21 dd  with ),(1 21 dd . Of course, an increase in the 
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concentration around the center of the acreage planted to commodity h  implies a de-
crease in the concentration for commodity l . Note that while an increase in the 
concentration, under Assumptions 1 and 2, is a mean-preserving contraction (mpc) in the 
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), the converse may not be true. Also, the intro-
duced notion of spatial production concentration is distinct from the diversification of 
production in the area measured by a Shannon’s entropy index,  
1
0
1
0 21
),( zzpH  
2121 ),(ln dzdzzzp  where ),(),( 2121 zzfzzp   
1
0
1
0 21
),(/ dFzz . This measure of 
production diversification (crop mix) does not take into account the location of acres, 
unlike Definition 1, which is better suited to model the response of equilibrium acreage 
allocation that differs across locations. However, starting with a uniform spatial acreage 
allocation (no production concentration),  ),( 21 dd  for all 21, dd FD , an increase 
in spatial production concentration implies a decrease in the measure of diversification of 
production in the region. 
To measure systematic risk or the extent of positive dependence present in the sys-
tem, the following notion is commonly used (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994).5 
 
DEFINITION 2. (The Supermodular Stochastic Order). A bivariate probability distribution 
),( 21 G  is said to be smaller than the probability distribution ),( 21 G  in the super-
modular stochastic order (denoted by sm	 ) if GddG 	  ),(),( 2121   for all 
supermodular functions   for which the expectations exist. 
 
A function   is called supermodular (submodular) if ])ˆ,max[],ˆ,(max[ 2211 xxxx  
],ˆ,(min[ 11 xx ])ˆ,min[ 22 xx ])ˆ,min[],ˆ,(max[)( 2211 xxxx	 ],ˆ,(min[ 11 xx
])ˆ,max[ 22 xx  for any 2211 ˆ,,ˆ, xxxx  in the domain. This property is equivalent to the 
“increasing (decreasing) differences” property: 0)(),( 21 	 xxji    for 2,1, ji , 
ji 
 , 0 , and 0 , where ),(),(),( 2121211 xxxxxx    . The supermodular 
stochastic order adequately captures the strength of positive dependence: “big (small) 
values of q1  go with big (small) values of q2 .” Furthermore, the ordering is possible 
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only if the joint distributions are possessed of the same marginals. According to Defini-
tion 2, the extent of market-specific uncertainty regarding the demand for commodity q  
decreases under the map ’,qq GG   such that  ’,qsm
q GG 	 . 
Merged Markets, Acreage Allocation, and Demand Uncertainty: Quantitative Effect 
In general, the effect of an increase in systematic demand risk across markets (a de-
crease in market-specific volatility) on production concentration can be decomposed into 
two effects: (a) the change in the total share of acres under a commodity, and (b) the 
change in the spatial distribution of acreage. First, I isolate the quantitative effect on the 
equilibrium acreage allocation. To do so, I consider a special case with 1BdF , where 
}0|:|,{ 2121  ddddB , that is, all acres for planting are concentrated in the area in the 
middle of the region. Note that such a distribution of acreage also arises if the two 
markets merge. The proximity of markets 1 and 2 can be modeled analogously to model 
an increase in dependence. As markets 1 and 2 move closer together, the number of 
producers that are either close to or far away from both markets increases, while the 
number of producers that are close to one market and far away from the other market 
decreases. Formally, this can be written as FddFF sm 	 ]),(max[ 211  for any F   
corresponding to a growing region where markets are more distant from each other, 
where 1F  is the marginal spatial distribution of acres relative to market 1. Alternatively, 
the analysis to follow adheres if there is no transportation cost for shipping commodities 
from any point in the region, 0e . 
In either of those cases, prices will be equalized across markets for any realization of 
demand uncertainty (see equation (2)): 
 ),(),( 2211 qqqqqq sPsP    for any q1 , q2 ],[  , hlq , , (6) 
where *21 
hh ss , and *21 1  ll ss . Here, 
*  is the unique equilibrium share of 
acres allocated to commodity h  that is invariant across the region (Assumption 2) and is 
determined at planting by equation (4). Suppose that there is an increase in the depend-
ence of the market-specific demand shocks for commodity q , ’,qsm
q GG 	 , hlq , . 
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Then in the new equilibrium the share of acres planted to commodity q  adjusts upward 
or downward depending on whether 0)(/ 212 	 qqqP  . The appendix shows that 
there are sufficient conditions such that the supermodularity (submodularity) of the 
market price qip  in ( qq 21 , ) holds. Summarizing gives the following. 
 
RESULT 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and 1BdF , where }0|:|,{ 2121  ddddB . 
Then acres planted to commodity q  increase (decrease) with an increase in the depend-
ence of the market-specific demand shocks for the commodity depending on whether 
0)(11 	qP  and 0)(1 	qP   for all qis  and qi , hlq , . 
 
An increase in dependence (an increase in systematic risk) among the demand shocks at 
markets 1 and 2 for commodity )( lh  in fact dampens the volatility of the “arbitraged” 
shipment, |5.0| *  hih s  ( |)1(5.0| *  lil s ). As market-specific demand shocks 
become more dependent, that is, when it is more likely that both of them are either “high” 
or “low” simultaneously, there is less likelihood that q  will deviate from zero. The 
curvature conditions on the inverse demand functions assure that the expectation of the 
price, qiEp , varies in a monotone manner with the volatility of the “arbitraged” shipment, 
q , and that they have a standard interpretation.   
Equilibrium Acreage Allocation and Demand Uncertainty: Spatial Pattern 
Next, I consider the effects of market-specific demand volatility and spatial acreage 
allocation on the volatility of the price differential between markets (or the “arbitraged” 
shipment) in a more general case, where not all producers are equally distanced from 
both markets. Let mpc	  denote a mean-preserving contraction of a probability distribution 
in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (a special case of the second-order stochastically 
dominating shift). 
 
RESULT 3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. (a) The volatility of the price differential 
between markets 1 and 2, qd , decreases with an increase in dependence among market-
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specific demand shocks for commodity q , that is, ’,qsm
q GG 	  implies )( qq Gd  
)( ’,qqmpc Gd	 , if 011 qP  and 01 qP   for all qis  and qi , and ff // 1**1 	  for hq   
and ff /)1/( 1**1   for lq   for all FDdd 21, . (b) The volatility of the differen-
tial for commodity h  ( l ) decreases (increases) with an increase (decrease) in the spatial 
production concentration of commodity h  ( l ) around the center, that is, ),( 21 dd  
),( 21 ddspc  	  implies )()(  	 hmpch dd  and )()(  lmpcl dd 	 .  
   
In light of Result 2, the linearity of the inverse demand functions required in part (a) 
allows a better isolation of the role of spatial dispersion of producers (and markets) by 
removing the “quantity” effect. The conditions imposed on the spatial acreage allocation 
are satisfied if, for example, there is no production concentration (in the sense of the 
entropy index),  ),( 21* dd , and the acres available for planting are distributed evenly 
in the region, 1),( 21 ddf  for all FDdd 21, . Note that the nature of the shifts of the 
distributions of qd  caused by an increase in demand shock dependence and production 
concentration is distinct. While an increase in demand shock dependence transforms the 
probabilities of the price differential, qd , a greater production concentration shifts the 
map of realizations of the price differentials “closer” to (“away from”) zero. 
Under certain conditions, a decrease in dependence among market-specific demand 
shocks and an increase in the concentration of commodity h  production have the oppo-
site effects on the expected incremental profit (5), which is convex in the price 
differentials hd  and ld . And so, Result 3 seems to indicate that an increase in the 
production concentration for a commodity is a feasible equilibrium response to a greater 
extent of market-specific demand volatility for that commodity. To verify this conjecture, 
I introduce a slightly weaker version of Definition 1.   
 
DEFINITION 3. (Local Production Concentration). Spatial distribution of shares of acres 
under commodity h , ),( 21 dd , is said to undergo a local (symmetric) increase in 
concentration in the region cddd 	 || 21 , around the center, denoted by 
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),( 21 dd ),( 21 ddlpc  	  if  
 

1
0 21
2
2
),(c
c
dz
dz
dFzz  
 


1
0 21
2
2
),(c
c
dz
dz
dFzz  and 
 
 

1
0 21
2
2
),(dz
dz
dFzz  
 

	
1
0 21
2
2
),(dz
dz
dFzz  for all ],0[ cdd  . 
 
To proceed, consider equilibrium with “complete” production concentration in the sense 
of Definition 3, where only one commodity is produced in the “middle” of the area. For 
concreteness, suppose that equilibrium acreage allocation is 1),( 21* dd  for 
hddd  || 21  and  ),( 21* dd  for hddd  || 21 .6 Furthermore, let conditions on the 
inverse demand functions in part (a) of Result 3 hold for commodity l . 
Now consider a decrease in dependence among market-specific demand shocks for 
commodity l , lsm
ll GGG 	 ’, . Then, by part (a) of Result 3 and the linearity of the 
inverse demand function, the expected profit differential (5) weakly decreases for pro-
ducers with lddd  || 21 , 0)( ’, ll Gd . Suppose that, by further decreasing the degree of 
dependence, the expected incremental profit becomes strictly negative. Then the new 
equilibrium acreage allocation, ),( 21 dd  , must be such that ),( 21 dd   ),( 21* ddlpc 	  
for some 0cd . This is because from the assumed linearity of the inverse demand 
function, ),( lilil sP  , it follows that ld  is directly proportional to 
 
 


1
0 21
*2
2
)),(1(
l
l
dz
dz
dFzz .  
Suppose that  
 


1
0 21
*2
2
)),(1(
l
l
dz
dz
dFzz  
 

	
1
0 21
2
2
)),(1(
l
l
dz
dz
dFzz  for all ld . Then, 
analogous to part (b) of Result 3, it can be shown that )()( *  	 lmpcl dd , and the 
expected profit differential (5) weakly decreases. But this is impossible because there is 
no commodity l  produced in the middle of the region while the profit from producing 
commodity l  is strictly larger than that for commodity h  for some producers with 
lddd  || 21 . Therefore, it follows that  
 


1
0 21
*2
2
)),(1(
l
l
dz
dz
dFzz  
 
 


1
0 21
2
2
)),(1(
l
l
dz
dz
dFzz  for some ld . Because 1),( 21* dd  for hddd  || 21  there 
exists a 0cd  such that ),( 21 dd   ),( 21* ddlpc 	 . Summarizing gives the following. 
Spatial Production Concentration, Demand Uncertainty, and Multiple Markets / 17 
RESULT 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, 011 lP  and 01 
lP
 
 for all lis  and 
l
i , and 
)1( *1*1   ff  for all FDdd 21, . Furthermore, suppose that 1),( 21* dd  for 
hddd  || 21  and )1,0(),( 21*   dd  for hddd  || 21 .7 Then a decrease in depend-
ence among the market-specific demand shocks for commodity l  implies a decrease in 
the local production concentration of commodity h  around the center, 
),( 21 dd  ),( 21* ddlpc 	  for some 0cd . 
 
In the next section, I consider in greater detail some determinants of equilibrium charac-
terized by a complete (local) production concentration around the center. 
Sufficient Conditions for Complete Spatial Production Concentration 
Let demand shocks for one of the commodities, for example, commodity l , be pos-
sessed of the greatest degree of systematic risk, that is, let it be perfectly correlated. 
Formally, this can be written as ]),(min[),( 21121 llllll GG   ),( 21’, lllsm G   for any 
other ),( 21’, lllG  .8 In other words, 1)Pr( 21  ll  , and barring any ex ante asymmetries 
between the two markets (excluded by Assumptions 1 and 2), at harvest time no com-
modity l  producers have an incentive to ship their crop to a relatively more distant 
market. The prices of commodity l  are always common across markets, 21 l
l pp   and 
0||sup  ll dd , for any realization of uncertainty. In contrast, hold that B hdG 0  for 
some }:,{ 2121  
B , so that not all demand risk for commodity h  is systematic. 
From Result 1 and Assumptions 1 and 2, it follows that equilibrium is characterized 
by 1),( 21* dd  for hddd  || 21  and )1,0(),( 21*   dd  for hddd  || 21 . Here, 
a single commodity is produced in the middle of the region and the mix of commodities 
is produced outside of that region. Only commodity h  producers may deliver their crop 
to a more distant market to take advantage of the price differential (e.g., producers with 
21 dd   shipping their crop to market 2.) The quantities of each commodity supplied to 
the markets at harvest are   
 
 

1
0 0
1
01
22
2
)(
hh
h
dzdz
dz
hh dFdFds  , 
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  
 
 
 

1
0
11
02 2
2
2
)(
h
h
h dz
dz
dz
hh dFdFds  ,  
 

1
0 01
2)1(
hdzl dFs  , and  
 

1
0
1
2
2
)1(
hdz
l dFs  . 
According to Definition 3, this spatial acreage allocation dominates any other allocation 
in terms of the local concentration of commodity h  production in the area around the 
center with hc dd  . The largest (smallest) amount of commodity h  is shipped to a 
market when the realization of market-specific demand shocks has the most dispersion: 
 h1 ,  
h
2 , or  
h
1 ,  
h
2 : 
 0),(),(  hhhhh dsPsP  ,  (7) 
where )(1 hhhh ddss   and )(1 hhhh ddss  . Summarizing gives the following. 
 
DEFINITION 4. (Equilibrium with Complete Local Production Concentration). Symmetric 
equilibrium with a complete local production concentration of commodity h  around the 
center is given by hdd * , the size of the concentration area, and  * , the share of 
commodity h  produced outside of the concentration area, such that equations (2), (4), 
and (7) hold. Some mathematical exposition presented in the appendix establishes the 
uniqueness of this equilibrium. 
 
RESULT 5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, ]),(min[),( 21121 llllll GG   , and B
hdG 0  
for some }:,{ 2121  
B . Then there is unique equilibrium with a complete local 
production concentration of commodity h  around the center, ( * , *d ) with )1,0(* d . 
 
Now I investigate how the size of the concentration region and the split of acreage 
outside of the region respond to the cost of transportation per unit distance and to the 
distribution of acreage available for planting. For example, a “global” increase in trans-
portation costs may be a result of higher fuel prices or the abandonment of a local 
railroad or an inland waterway system. The distribution of acreage available for planting 
is influenced by a multitude of factors, including various alternative uses, environmental 
regulations, and the proximity to urban centers.  
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Equilibrium Effects of Transportation Cost and Acreage Distribution 
Next I consider the effect of a uniform increase in transportation cost, e , on the equi-
librium acreage allocation with a complete concentration of commodity h  in the middle 
of the region (Definition 4). Equilibrium conditions are now given by equation (4) and 
 0),(),( 2211  hhhqhhq edsPsP  , (2a) 
 0),(),(  hhhhh desPsP  . (7a) 
From these equations, it follows that the size of the concentration (“arbitrage”) area must 
decline with the transportation cost, e . Suppose that, on the contrary, the size of the 
concentration area, *d , increases. Inspecting equation (7a), it is clear that the share of 
commodity h  outside of the concentration area, * , must adjust, because otherwise the 
difference, ),( hh sP ),( hh sP , decreases, which contradicts the assumption. Suppose 
that *  increases. Then equation (4) no longer holds because supply of commodity l  
decreases while that of commodity h  increases for all realizations of uncertainty. Sup-
pose that *  decreases. Then (7a) implies that   
 
 

1
0 0
*
1
0
*
2
*
2
*
2
dzdz
dz
h dFdFs   must 
decrease because  
 

1
0 0
*
*
2 dzh dFs   is clearly smaller than before. Hence, the total 
supply of commodity l  increases, which is impossible if Condition 4 continues to hold. 
Therefore, the size of the concentration area *d  must decrease with the transportation cost 
e . The effect of the transportation cost on the share of commodity h  outside of the concen-
tration area *  is ambiguous, as illustrated using a special case in Result 4, part (a). 
Next, I inquire into the effects of the spatial acreage distribution in the region on the 
equilibrium distribution of acreage allocation. Consider a shift of acreage available for 
planting toward the middle of the region, FF spc 	  (use Definition 1 with 
1),(),( 2121  dddd  .) Inspecting equation (7a), it follows that in the new equilib-
rium, *d  must adjust downward because   
 
 

1
0 0
*
1
01
*
2
*
2
*
2
)()( dzdz
dz
h FdFFdFs   
  
  


1
0 0
*
1
0
*
2
*
2
*
2
)( dzdz
dz
dFFdF  )(1 Fs h , as long as )()( ** FF   . In general, the 
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effect of the acreage shift on *  is ambiguous. This is demonstrated using a two-point 
distribution of demand shocks for commodity h , 
  

,
),( hg , 
  

,
),( hg , 
),( hg  
  

,
),( hg . Here, the probability distribution of hmd  is concentrated at 
just  three points (at most), )Pr()Pr( hhhh dddd 
  

,
 , and 
  

,
)0Pr( hd  
  

,
 . Therefore, for the purposes of investigating the effects of a greater acreage 
concentration on equilibrium allocation, any shift of the acreage into the middle of the 
region, FFF spc , given the symmetry of acreage distribution, can be summarized 
as follows:  
  
*
21
*
21 |||| dddddd
dFFd , and  

*
21
*
21 |||| dddddd
dFFd , 0 . 
Some further exposition shown in the appendix leads to the following: 
 
RESULT 6. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, ]),(min[),( 21121 llllll GG   , and ),( hg  
2/1),( hg . Then the size of the concentration area, *d , decreases, and the share of 
commodity h  outside of the concentration area *  decreases or increases, depending on 
),()1( 1* lilil sEP  ),()2/1( 1*  hh sP ),()2/( 1*  hh sP 0)(	 , with (a) a small 
increase in transportation cost, eee  ; or (b) a small increase in acreage concentra-
tion around the center, FF  Fspc . 
 
Conclusions 
The model developed in this paper is used to study the effects of the distribution of 
terminal markets (or the concentration of end users) in a growing area on equilibrium of 
spatial acreage allocation. Here, I find that the multi-market environment may have an 
immediate impact on spatial acreage allocation. In particular, I inspect the possibility of a 
spatial concentration of production driven by commodity- and market-specific price 
volatilities. I discuss the effects of a “greater” spatial concentration of production and 
“greater” market-specific demand volatility on the probability distribution of the price 
differential between markets. I also establish sufficient conditions for a complete local 
Spatial Production Concentration, Demand Uncertainty, and Multiple Markets / 21 
spatial concentration of production and explore the equilibrium effects of acreage distri-
bution and transportation costs in this case. 
A similar analysis of spatial acreage allocation patterns may also apply in the case of 
commodities differentiated based on the extent of genetic modification (GM) present in 
the seed. In this case, the degree of substitutability in consumption of GM and non-GM 
varieties and the different costs of processing warrant modifications of the demand side 
of the model. In addition, much greater care needs to be exercised when decomposing 
demand uncertainty into systematic and commodity- and market-specific components. 
To focus on the role of location and market-specific demand uncertainty on planting 
decisions, among other issues, I ignored the temporal dimension of the marketing plan 
that spans the period between the two harvests (Benirschka and Binkley 1995; Frechette 
and Fackler 1999). In the case of a single terminal market, quality-differentiated com-
modities, and a multi-period marketing environment, acreage allocation decisions may 
vary across locations (Saak 2003). Therefore, it is of interest to understand how planting 
and marketing decisions are made under more realistic circumstances, including the case 
in which plural terminal markets and marketing periods and market-specific demand 
uncertainty are present.  
  
Endnotes 
1. In general, the distribution of acres will not have a strictly positive support every-
where on n]1,0[  because some combinations of distances to markets may not be 
possible. In particular, 0)0,...,0( f  implies that all markets are located at the same 
point; otherwise, it must be that 0)0,...,0( f . 
2. For example, the effects of this type of uncertainty on acreage allocation between 
genetically modified and standard varieties are studied in Saak and Hennessy 2002. 
3. The distances to markets need not correspond to Eucledian distances in a rectangular 
coordinate system.  
4. Because there are only two markets, I drop the subscripts on qd12  and qd 12 , and take 
qq dd 12  and qq dd 12 . 
5. Hennessy and Lapan (2003) provide a fundamental treatment of the concept of 
“more systematic risk” and its formalizations in a broad economic setting with some 
applications. The supermodular stochastic order is used widely in insurance and fi-
nancial management literatures. 
6. In the next section, I consider environments where such patterns exist in equilibrium. 
For example, using Result 1, along with Assumptions 1 and 2, this spatial pattern 
emerges if the price of commodity l  does not vary across markets, 0ld . However, 
note that the lack of variation is not necessary for the spatial allocation pattern where 
only one commodity is produced in the “middle” of the region.  
7. We ignore the derivative condition )1( *1*1   ff  on the set of zero measure 
hddd  || 21 . 
8. This is a well-known property of the Frechet upper bound for distribution 
),(min[),( xHyxH x	  )](yH y  with marginals )(),( yHxH yx . The random variables with 
distribution function ),( yxH ),(min[ xH x  )](yH y  are called co-monotonic.
  
 
 
Appendix 
Proofs of Results 
 
 
Proof of Result 1  
Without loss of generality, suppose that in equilibrium li
h
Mi DD }{}{    
  for some 
i  and },...,{ jiM   where nji 		1 . Then it must be that ),...,( 1 ndd  0  for some 
),....,( 1 ndd hiD }{ . Otherwise, when at harvest time equilibrium the price differential is 
such that hij
h
j
h
i dpp   for all ij 
 , there are no commodity h  producers supplying 
market i , which cannot be in equilibrium. Note that the expected profits for producers of 
both commodities in areas qiD }{  are ),,...,( 1 qdd n  qiqi cdEp   because they are 
located in the “no-arbitrage region.” Hence, in planting time equilibrium it must be that 
ll
i
hh
i cEpcEp   so that some commodity h  is produced in that region. But this 
implies that all producers in areas with li
h
Mi DD }{}{    prefer to grow commodity h  
because for them ),,...,( 1 hdd n  
  
h
j
h
jiMj
cdpE ][max  ilihihi dEpcdEp   
lc ),,...,( 1 ldd n  as they may switch from supplying market i  to supplying market 
Mj  to their advantage. And so, 1),...,( 1 ndd  for all ),...,( 1 ndd lih Mi DD }{}{   . 
Next, note that it cannot be that lli
hh
i cEpcEp   so that 1),...,( 1 ndd  for all 
),....,( 1 ndd hiD }{ . Because then, when at harvest time equilibrium the price differential is 
such that lij
l
j
l
i dpp   for all ij 
 , there is no commodity l  producers supplying 
market i , which cannot be in equilibrium. Hence, equilibrium is characterized by 
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ll
i
hh
i cEpcEp   and  l
i
h
i DD
n dFzz
}{}{
),...,( 1
 
 )1,0( , and 1),...,( 1 ndd (0) for all 
),...,( 1 ndd lih Mi DD }{}{    ( hil Mi DD }{}{   ), ni ,...,1 . 
 
Proof of Result 2 
Substitute the expressions hh ss 1*2    and ll ss 1*2 )1(    in equation (6) in the 
text. Differentiating ),( 11 qqq sP   twice yields qqqP 212 /    
]/)[,( 111111 qqqqq ssP   ]/[ 21 qqs  ),(]/)[,( 11121121111 qqqqqqqqq sPssP     
]/[ 21 qqs  . Using condition (6) to find qiqs  /1  and qqqs 2112 /   , write 
qqqP 21
2 /   32,1,1,1
2,
11
2,
1
1,
11 /)( APPPPPP qqqqqq    21,1,12,12,2,11,1 /)( APPPPPP qqqqqq       , 
where 2,1
1,
1
qq PPA   and the superscripts “ iq, ” denote the type of commodity and 
market where it is sold. Hence, it follows that 0)(/ 212 	 qqqP   when 0)(11 	qP  
and 0)(1 	qP  . 
 
Proof of Result 3  
(a) Differentiating (2) twice shows that the conditions stated in the result suffice to 
assure that the price differential for commodity q  is submodular in demand shocks, 
0/ 21
2 	 qqqd  . To show that when the submodularity condition holds, an increase in 
dependence implies that )()( ’,qqmpcqq GdGd 	 , consider the following. The symmetry 
imposed by Assumption 1 assures that   ’,qqqq dGddGd  0 . Next, consider a twice 
differentiable function )( qdH , where 0,0  HH . Differentiation yields 
]/[/ 1212 qqqq dHH   ]/[ 2qqd  ]/[ 212 qqqdH    0	 . Note that 
’,q
sm
q GG 	  implies that  qhhq dGdH )),(( 21  	 ’,21 )),(( qhhq dGdH  . Because H  is an 
arbitrary increasing and convex function, the last condition implies that 
)()( ’,qqmpcqq GdGd 	 . 
(b) It must be shown that an increase in the production concentration around the cen-
ter in the region for commodity h , ),( 21 dd ),( 21 ddspc  	  implies that )(hd  
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)( 	 hmpc d . Note that the absolute value of the price differential between markets 1 and 
2 decreases,  |)),(()),((| 2211 hhhhhh sPsP  )),((| 11 hhh sP   |)),(( 22 hhh sP    because 
)(1 hs 	 
 1
0 0 21
2 ),(zd
h
dFzz  
 

1
0 0 21
2 ),()( zd
h
dFzz  )(1   hs  and )(2 hs  
 
 
1
0
1
21
2
),(
zd h
dFzz  
 
	
1
0
1
21
2
),()(
zd h
dFzz )(2   hs  depending on whether 0)(	hd . 
Therefore, it must be that |),,(||),,(| 2121 hhhhhh dd  	  for each hh 21 , , in order for the 
harvest time equilibrium to be restored. Hence, write 		 )),,(Pr( 21 dd hhh   
)),,(Pr()( 21 dd hhh 	   for 0)(d , which implies that )()(  	 hmpch dd . Also, by 
symmetry, it follows that )()(  lmpcl dd 	 . 
 
Proof of Result 5  
Without loss of generality, let B
hdG 0  for },{ 21  B . Differentiating 
(7) in the text yields BAd h //   , where )],(),([ 11  hhhh sPsPA    
 1
0 0
2 pdz dF , 
 
1
0 2221
),()[,( dzzdzfsPB hhh  ]),()1( 1
0 222  dzzdzf
h  
1),(),( 1
0 2221
  dzzdzfsP hhh  . Differentiating (2) yields DCd h //   , 
 
 

1
0 0221111
2)][,(),([
hdzhhhhhh dFsPsPC  ]/[),()1( 1
0 222
   hh ddzzdzf , 
1),()),(),(( 1
0 222221111
  dzzdzfsPsPD hhhhhhh  . Differentiating )],([ 11 hhh sPE   with 
respect to   yields   /),( 11 hhh sEP  ),({ 111 hhh sPE   
 1
0 0
2[
hdz
dF  
 
1
0 222
),()1( dzzdzf h )/(  hd )]}/(),(1
0 222
  hh ddzzdzf . Note that the sign 
of the expression in the square brackets is positive because substituting DCd h //    
yields the following ])/[),()1({( 1
0 222
1
0 0
2    
  hhdz ddzzdzfdF
h
){( 2,11,1 hh PP   
}1),(1
0 222
 dzzdzf h ][),( 2,11,1
1
0 222
hhh PPdzzdzf    
 1
0 0
2[
hdz
dF  )1(   
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 
1
0 222
),( dzzdzf h Dd h /)]}/(    
  1
0 222
1
0 0
),()1((2{ 2 dzzdzfdF hdz
h
  
])/[  hd }2/1),({( 1
0 222
1,
1  dzzdzfP hh 0/ D . Therefore,   /),( 11 hhh sEP  0 . 
Finally, differentiating )],([ lilil sPE   with respect to   yields   /),( 11 lll sEP  
),({ 111 lll sPE   )1([
1
0 0
2  
 
hdz
dF )]/(),(1
0 222
 hh ddzzdzf . Note that the sign 
of the expression in the square brackets is negative, as substituting BAd h //    
yields ),({[ 11
1
0 0
2 hh
dz
sPdF
h
 
 
  
1
0 222
),([ dzzdzf h ]),()1( 1
0 222  dzzdzf
h  
}1),()0,( 1
0 22221
  dzzdzfsP hhh  )1,([),()1( 11
1
0 222
hhh sPdzzdzf   )]0,( 21 hh sP  
BdF
hdz
/]1
0 0
2
 
 
  
 1
0 21110
)]0,()1,({[[ 2 hhhhdz sPsPdF
h
 
1
0 222
),( dzzdzf h }]1 0/ B . 
Therefore, 0/),( 11   lll sEP . This implies that there exists a unique *  that solves 
equation (4). The observed monotonicity of the left-hand sides of equations (2) and (7) in, 
respectively, hd  and hd  guarantees the uniqueness of equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Result 6 
It must be shown that 0/*  d  and 0)(/*    depending on 
),()1( 11 lill sEP  ),()2/1( 11  hh sP  ),()2/( 11  hh sP 0)( 	 , where e,  . The 
conditions of the result imply that equilibrium *d  and *  is given by two equations: 
),()2/1(),( 11* lllhh sEPdsP   0)(  lh cc , and 0),(),( *  edsPsP hhhh  , 
where 2/)1()1( *1
0 0
*
1
*
2    
 dzl dFs ,   
  


1
0 0
*
1
0
*
2
*
2
*
2
dzdz
dz
h dFdFs   
)2/1( *  , and 2/*1
0 0
*
*
2    
 dzh dFs . Straightforward differentiation shows 
that the Jacobian determinant for this system of equations is strictly negative if 
0
*
21 ||

 

ddd
dF . Then differentiating the two equations with respect to   and e , and 
using the implicit function theorem establishes the result. 
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